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Performance Standards and Welfare Reform
A well-designed performance standard system for welfare-to-work programs has the
potential to significantly increase the employment of a portion of the welfare caseload.
Performance standards will not “end welfare as we know it,” eliminate teenage motherhood, or
bring all welfare recipients out of poverty. But performance standards could help restore public
confidence in the goals and effectiveness of our welfare system.
What Are Performance Standards? 
In welfare programs, a performance standard system provides rewards and penalties for
different agencies and employees in the welfare system depending on how well they achieve
defined goals. Usually these goals are greater employment and earnings for welfare recipients. The
primary purpose of establishing these goals, rewards, and penalties is to motivate agencies and
welfare system employees to more vigorously and efficiently pursue the goals of increased
earnings and employment of welfare recipients.
Performance standard systems can be distinguished by which part of the welfare system’s
performance is being measured and by whom. Performance standards can be used by federal
officials to measure state performance, by state officials to monitor local welfare offices’
performance, by local offices to monitor contractors, and by local offices or contractors to
monitor individual staff.
Two of the most successful welfare-to-work programs, ET (Employment and Training)
Choices in Massachusetts during the 1980s and GAIN in Riverside County, California during the
1980s and 1990s, both aggressively used performance standards. ET Choices motivated local
welfare offices in Massachusetts by setting monthly job placement goals and by firing or demoting
local office directors for poor performance (Behn 1991). In Riverside County, case managers,
supervisory units, and district offices all have job placement goals. Meeting the goals is an
important part of the job performance evaluation of individual staff (Riccio, Friedlander and
Freedman 1994). 
Riverside County’s orientation toward employment is still unusual for the welfare system.
Local welfare offices have been slow to move away from their traditional focus on reducing errors
in making welfare payments and toward a focus on linking recipients with jobs. The slowness of
change is partly due to the lack of federal performance standards for employment outcomes in the
JOBS program—the welfare-to-work program created by the Family Support Act of 1988.
The reluctance of the federal government to adopt employment-oriented performance
standards reflects a concern that such standards could distort the welfare system?s operations.
One concern is that standards for employment and earnings outcomes could lead to “creaming,” in
which welfare-to-work programs only help recipients who are most likely to succeed without
help. A second concern is that performance measures might be so poorly correlated with the true
“value added” of a particular welfare office or employee that the performance standards would be
perceived as unfair, and would therefore lower employee morale. These concerns must be
addressed if any performance standards system is to do more good than harm.
Guidelines for Performance Standards
Previous experience with performance standards in welfare-to-work programs and other
social programs suggests the following guidelines for an effective standard system (Bartik, 1995):
1. Performance standards should focus on only a few key performance standards. This
helps give firmer direction to the welfare system, avoiding conflicting goals.
2. To ensure that standards are perceived as fair, they should be adjusted for local
economic conditions and the local client mix, and in particular for the prior earnings and welfare
history of clients. Previous research suggests that with a few adjustments to the performance
standards, there is likely to be a significant positive correlation between the performance measure
and the true “value added” of the welfare-to-work program.
3. Performance measures should be based on the success of some objectively identifiable
group of disadvantaged individuals. Welfare agencies and employees should not be able to select
“who counts” in meeting the standards. The entire welfare caseload, or some objectively
identifiable portion of the caseload, could be used in defining performance standards if there are
safeguards to ensure that welfare eligibility criteria cannot be manipulated to increase the
performance measure. For example, performance measures should be adjusted so that welfare
agencies are unable to increase their performance by throwing individuals who are not working
off the welfare rolls.
4. Whether some agency or staff member meets the performance standards should have
some real but modest consequences. The consequences should be modest to avoid overstressing
standards that inevitably will be imperfect.
5. Wherever possible, data needed for calculating the performance measures should be
obtained from administrative sources such as welfare department records or unemployment
insurance earnings files. Use of administrative data will hold down data collection costs and
increase data accuracy.
6. In medium size or larger cities, local welfare offices can monitor the performance of
welfare-to-work contractors by randomly assigning welfare recipients among contractors. The
relative performance of the contractors may be used to decide the amount of payment to
contractors and how many future welfare recipients will be assigned to a contractor. In
Kalamazoo, a county of less than a quarter million people, the Upjohn Institute is currently using
random assignment among three different providers for the initial job search and job development
phase of Michigan’s Work First program for welfare recipients.
A well-designed performance standard system is no substitute for experimental studies,
using random assignment, of what programs will best contribute to the long- term success of
welfare recipients. Although many welfare-to-work programs have shown short-run success in
getting welfare recipients back to work quicker, few programs have shown long-term success
(Friedlander and Burtless, 1994).
Federal Welfare Reform
What role can performance standards play in the current stalemate over welfare reform? In
January of 1996, President Clinton vetoed the congressional Republicans’ welfare reform bill,
which would have eliminated the individual entitlement to welfare assistance and turned welfare
over to the states as a block grant. The outlook for welfare reform during 1996 and 1997 is
uncertain. Three scenarios seem possible: (1) no welfare reform bill is enacted; (2) a “block grant”
welfare reform bill is enacted that allows for a considerable federal role in setting performance
standards; (3) a “block grant” welfare reform bill is enacted, but without allowing much federal
oversight.
If no welfare reform bill is enacted, a window of opportunity is opened up again to
“improve welfare as we know it” rather than end it. The federal government could set
employment- and earnings-oriented performance standards for states, and encourage states to do
the same for local welfare offices. Some versions of a welfare reform block grant also allow for a
federal role in setting performance standards.
On the other hand, if a block grant welfare reform eliminates federal oversight of state
welfare programs, then states must take the lead in setting performance standards for local
welfare offices, contractors, and employees. The concern is whether most states, absent federal
oversight, will focus resources on the difficult task of increasing the employment and earnings of
welfare recipients. Under a block grant, the marginal dollar of welfare expenditure is totally paid
for by the state, with no federal match. In addition, states will have more freedom to reduce their
own welfare spending and divert funds to other purposes. State welfare spending is politically
unpopular, serves a narrow segment of the population, and does not advance a state?s economic
development. States will be tempted to reduce their commitment to welfare programs, and use
those resources for activities with a greater payoff for more state residents: education, general tax
relief, and economic development programs. The easiest and cheapest way to reduce state welfare
spending is not to improve welfare-to-work efforts, but to reduce benefit levels and restrict
welfare eligibility.
Therefore, if we want better performance of the welfare system in increasing the
employment and earnings of welfare recipients, it is essential to maintain a strong federal role in
the welfare system. A well-designed performance standards system, focused on earnings and
employment of welfare recipients, could allow both a strong federal role and great state and local
flexibility. State and local governments would have the flexibility to choose the best methods,
given local circumstances, to increase the earnings and employment of welfare recipients. The
federal government would set performance standards, monitor performance, administer rewards
or sanctions, and fund evaluations of innovative approaches to welfare reform. This continued
strong federal role is consistent with the traditional wisdom in public finance that income
redistribution should be the responsibility of the federal government, as the mobility of businesses
and upper-income households makes this task too difficult for state and local governments
.
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